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A Modest Proposal to
Insure Justice for
Victims of Crime
[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser
also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it
is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance
true.'
James E. Starrs*
INTRODUCTION
Fish, I am told, will rise to the surface when dynamite is
thrown into the water. Unfortunately, the problems of the crime
victim cannot be so easily or dramatically resolved. His sub-
mergence has been too long unrelieved for any single, quick
palliative to redeem him now. Yet proposals are needed and pro-
test too. The combination may be enough to make amends for
years of semi-official insouciance to the lot of the crime victim.
Whatever may be the impact of this symposium and the sug-
gestions it elicits upon the development of realistic programs for
compensating crime victims, it indicates a professional sensitivity
which could have ramifications upon a much larger scene. I refer
to those other victims who, in uncompensated dismay, haunt the
fringes of the present discussion.2 Among them are the automobile
accident victims,3 the victims of professional misconduct, includ-
ing that of members of the legal profession,4 and the victims, by
*Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
1. N r. Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
2. See EBmumzwnr, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
3. Note, Saskatchewan Automobile Accident Insurance Act, 1950 INs. L.J.
702.
4. AID. LAws 1965, ch. 799 empowers the Maryland Court of Appeals
to establish a client's security fund and to finance it by requiring an annual
assessment, not in excess of $20, from all practicing attorneys in the
state; Bloom, The Debt of Honor Our Lawyers Want to Pay, Reader's Digest,
March 1961, p. 202; Voorhees, Clients' Security Funds: How They Grew in
1962, 49 A.B.A.J. 251 (1963); Voorhees, A Clients Security Fund for New
York, 33 N.Y.S.B.S. 129 (1961).
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discharge or acquittal, of abortive criminal prosecutions. 5
I refer also to the desperate paucity of available empirical data
on the subject which we pretend to address with some degree of
expertise. Who are the victims of crime? To what economic
strata do they belong?7 Do the answers to the preceding ques-
tions vary from crime to crime? To what degree do victims facili-
5. The Maryland Legislative Council unsuccessfully introduced a bill in
the 1965 legislative session to reimburse a defendant, if found not guilty of the
crime charged, for counsel fees, court costs, and investigative and similar
expenses incurred in the preparation for trial of the case. Correspondence to
author from the Director of the Administrative Office of the Maryland Courts.
This proposal gave concrete force to the state's responsibility to compensate
the victims of its own processes. This was a considerable advance in both time
and policy over the Statute of Westminster 11 (1285), chapter 12, which made
one who brought an unsuccessful appeal of a felony liable to imprisonment and
to pay damages for the defamation of the appellee. Cf. PLUCKNETT, A CoN-
cise HISTORY OF THE Co VimoN LAW 484 (5th ed. 1956). But, in those early
years of the common law, a criminal prosecution was less a state affair than an
instrument to redress individual grievances.
6. However, some, often only localized, studies do exist. The Statistical
and Records Bureau of the New York City Police Department issues an
annual report of its study of homicides committed in New York City which
is so detailed that it even tabulates the number of homicides committed by
day of the week. Another is WOLFGANG, PATTERNS iN CRI iNAL HOEICIDE
(1958). A detailed study of homicides in one urban area is presented in
BENSING & SCHROEDER, HOMICIDE IN AN URBAN Co ,mnimTy (1960). Wolf-
gang's hypotheses were applied to a selected group in St. Louis, Missouri and
the results reported in Pittman & Handy, Patterns in Criminal Aggravated
Assault, 55 J. Camr. L., C. & P.S. 462 (1964).
See also voN HIENTIG, THE CRIMINrL AND HIS VIcTIM 383-450 (1948);
McCLINrTocK, CRnMES OF VIOLENCE (Vol. XVIII, Cambridge Studies in Crimi-
nology, 1963); MCCLINTOCK & GIBsoN, ROBBERY IN LONDON (Vol. XIV, Cam-
bridge Studies in Criminology, 1961); RADzINowvIcz, SEXUAL OFFENSES 89-93
(Vol. IX, Cambridge Studies in Criminology, 1957); REPORT OF THE ROY.AL
COIMMIsSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Appendix III, Tables 4 and 5, pp.
304-06 (1953) which analyzes the victims of convicted murderers in England
and Wales from 1900 to 1949.
It has been said that the present statistical deficiencies prevent us from
judging "the gravity of the state of crime" and hinder "effective preventive
measures." 1964 CAMB. LJ. 218-20.
7. McClintock's 1963 study reveals that:
the majority of crimes of violence [committed in Metropolitan London
during 1950, 1957 and 19601 occurr[ed] among working class people
living in poor neighborhoods; this was predominantly so in cases of do-
mestic strife and neighborhood quarrels, as well as in attacks and fights
in public houses, caf6s and in the streets. In spite of the increase in
crimes of violence there has been little tendency for such offenses to
take place in respectable residential districts.
MCCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra note 6, at 56. Similar findings as to sex crimes are
reported for the United States. See GEBHARD, GAGNON, POMEROY & CHRISTEN-
SON, SEX OFFENDERS (1965).
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tate the crimes which are committed upon them?" How many
crime victims are compensated by voluntary or government in-
surance programs, and to what extent?9 As to some of these ques-
tions we may make rough estimates. Others are more imponder-
able.
Other questions probe the "after-conduct" of crime victims.
Professor Schafer asks if the punishment of the offender by the
state satisfies the victim's desire for revenge. ° How often does the
victim institute civil proceedings against the offender to recover
his damages?" To what extent is he successful, in terms both
of judgments returned and satisfactions received? Do the fruits
8. The part played by the victim in promoting the commission of a crime
upon himself may, to some degree, be determined by the nature of his rela-
tionship to the offender. Where that relationship is a close family or social one,
we might expect to find evidence of greater victim facilitation. MCCLINTOCK,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 86. At the very least,
in the matter of enforcement of the law and protection of the public,
a robbery resulting in murder or a murderous sexual attack on a
stranger involve very different considerations when compared with a
murder arising from domestic strife or arguments between two people
working together.
Id. at 218-19.
McClintock's study of London crimes of violence during 1950, 1957 and
1960 revealed that "the number of homicides and murderous assaults on
strangers would be less than 1 in 10 of the total." Id. at 219. This data led
the authors to conclude that "crimes of violence that occur in the family or
between persons who are well-known to each other may almost be regarded as
a separate species of violent behaviour.... ." Id. at 248. (Emphasis added.)
Professor Wolfgang has gone further and asserted that "in many cases
the victim has most of the major characteristics of an offender." If so, this
constitutes a not insignificant objection to crime victim compensation. See
Wolfgang, Victim Precipitated Criminal Homicide, 48 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S.
1, 11 (1957).
In the United States, a recent analysis of the F.B.I.'s Uniform Crime
Reports reveals that "four out of five homicide victims are killed by someone
they know, frequently members of their own family." Sparks, Terror in the
Street?, Commonweal, June 4, 1965, pp. S45, 846. In fact, 80% of all reported
homicides in 1964 involved acquaintances, of which 31% were within the
family. 1965 UIm-oRA CRihm RLPORTS 7.
9. Of all property damage claims for reported fires of known cause against
fire insurance companies between 1953 and 1969,, 1.2% resulted from incendiar-
ism, vandalism, and other criminal causes. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF H U.S.,
table 652, p. 482 (1964). However, it remains to be determined how many
fires caused by a criminal agency resulted in how much uninsured loss.
10. Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim
Modernized, 50 Min-. L. Rnv. 243 (1965).
11. It is not inconceivable that the victim may have recourse to a civil
action for damages. Witness the report of the victim of a robbery who brought
suit in New Jersey against the alleged offenders for "severe physical and
mental injury." N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1964, p. 39, col. 8 (city ed.).
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of a civil proceeding disincline the victim to cooperate in the
criminal proceeding?' How is this reluctance manifested? Is lack
of cooperation more evident in some crimes than others? Is there
any divergence, in this regard, between a judgment which is satis-
fied by the offender and the receipt of benefits from an insurance
company? And from these inquiries, there could easily erupt the
specter of victim recidivism.
In spite of the unanswered statistical and relational
questions, much can be accomplished here. We can expose
those whose concern for the victim is only to aid their primary
object to convict, or to diminish the legal protections of
the accused.' 3 We can attack the citadel by revealing the incon-
gruity of the state's exacting its pound of flesh in the form of costs
from the accused 14 or even from one who has been acquitted,"S
12. In recognition of the possibility that a compensated claimant will be
an uncooperative complainant, a number of mob action statutes condition the
municipality's liability upon reasonable diligence by the claimant "to procure
the conviction of the offenders." See statutes listed in footnote 16 infra.
Anthropologists have long recognized that compensation, in primitive so-
cieties, served the necessary function of buying off "the impulse to avenge
the wrong." Redfield, Primitive Law, 33 U. CINc. L. REV. 1, 7 (1964).
13. It has been said that child victims of sex crimes "suffer more from
society's 'furious pursuit' of the offender than from the crime itself." N.Y.
Times, May 26, 1965, p. 32, col. 2 (city ed.). In Washington, D.C., the heart-
less and insulting treatment of rape victims by the city's officialdom has re-
sulted in a proposal for free medical care for crime victims in the city's hos-
pitals. Washington Post, August 17, 1965, p. B1, cols. 7, 8.
All too often the interests of crime victims are cited by law enforcement
officials who are more concerned with the prosecution of the offender than with
restitution to the victim. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1964, p. 39, col. 8 (city ed.).
Paradoxically, the more spirited the battle waged by due process advocates
for greater protections in the criminal process for the accused, the greater
the likelihood that the crime victim will be uncompensated in that proceeding.
This possibility arises from the contentions of the disputants. To answer those
who assert their outrage at the release of guilty persons on "technical" constitu-
tional grounds, the criminal process is characterized as a venture in which the
interests of society predominate over those of either the victim or the accused.
But that argument loses much of its potency if the victim is permitted to join
his civil claim for damages in the criminal prosecution.
14. Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34, 84, 135 Pac. 749, 751 (1918); PA. STAT.
ANt. tit. 19, § 1222 (1964); VA. CODE ANx. § 14.1-100 (1950). In some states,
the prosecuting attorney is exempt from the assessment of costs. VA. CODE
ANN. § 14.1-201 (1950). There would not seem to be any constitutional im-
pediment to such an assessment, at least where the prosecution is motivated
by malice and lacks probable cause. Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1896). Other
statutes permit levying costs of the issuance of an invalid arrest or search
warrant upon the person, other than the prosecuting attorney, on whose com-
plaint it issued. N.M. STAT. ANw. § 41-1-3 (1953).
15. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 202 Pa. Super. 294, 196 A.2d 189 (1963),
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while refusing its assistance to the victim. We can challenge our
legislators to supplant those rudimentary statutes which com-
pensate the victims of mob action for property damages they
have sustained, 6 which penalize the publication of the name of
a rape victim, 17 and which propose to reimburse those who have
been acquitted for the costs of their defense,' with more compre-
hensive, more deliberative and more direct assistance. And finally
we can stir the quiescent conscience of the community to reflect
upon the collective responsibility which it may well have for
aff'd, 415 Pa. 189, 202 A.2d 55 (1964), 17 STAN. L. REV. 152, prob. juris. noted
381 U.S. 923 (1965).
16. Some permit recovery for both property damage and personal injuries
sustained from mob action. hLL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 25-3 (1963); Wis. STAT.
AN. § 66.091 (1957), as applied and construed in Febock v. Jefferson County,
219 Wis. 154, 262 N.W. 588, 101 A.L.R. 95 (1935). Others limit recovery to
property damages. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 50140; MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 269, § 8
(1956) (V/ of the value of property damaged if of the value of $50 or more);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-15-13 (1956) (34 of the value of property destroyed or
injured if of the value of $50 or more, however, no recovery if stolen during
a riot, Goldman v. Forcier, 68 R.I. 291, 27 A.2d 340 (1942)). Others are vague
as to the amount of property damage recoverable. IM.. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §
25-3 (1963) ("material damage to property"). Some condition recovery upon
the owner's reasonable diligence "to procure the conviction of the offenders."
A. ss. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 8 (1956); R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-15-13 (1956). In
New York, the mob action statute (N.Y. Mumc. LAw § 71) has been inopera-
tive during the extended defense emergency period. NENw YoRK STATE DE-
FENCE EMERGENCY ACT, N.Y. UNCoNsOL. LAws § 9193(3) (McKinney
1961); Finkelstein v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 271, 47 N.Y.S.2d 156
(Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 662, 53 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1945). But the
recent racial riots in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant have caused one New
York City Councilman to urge the passage of a bill to compensate the
victims of these riots. Its opponents claim "it would invite a deluge of 'phony
claims' against the city." N. Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1964, p. 23, col. 1 (city
ed.). See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R. 569 (1928); Annot., 44 AJL.R. 1137
(1926); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 297 (1922); Annot., 13 A.L.R. 751 (1919).
17. In South Carolina, it is a misdemeanor to publish, without a court
order, the name of the victim of a rape. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-81 (1962). The
Supreme Court of North Carolina will not publish, in its official opinion, the
name of a sodomy victim, even though the victim is identified by name in the
indictment. State v. Whittemore, 255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1961). Clearly,
only a macabre curiosity would be satisfied by such publication, although
that is not true of the details of other acts, i.e., the execution of criminals, the
publication of which is frequently prohibited by statute. VA. CODE AN. §
19.1-306.1 (1950). One author commented wryly that if capital punishment is
to have the deterrent efficacy that some would ascribe to it, the report of an
execution should "remind each taxpayer in detail of what he may expect."
CAirus, RE LECTIONS ON = GULLOTINE IN RESISTANCE, REBELLION AND
DnATH 137 (Modern Library ed. 1960).
18. See note 5 supra.
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restitution to crime victims as well as the rehabilitation of the
criminals themselves.
THE POSSIBILITIES
The only proposal for alleviating the burdens borne by victims
of crime to receive more than token discussion or to be adopted
anywhere in recent times is state-administered compensation."9
Professor Mueller, in an early article on the subject,2 0 affirmed
that state compensation was the only arguable plan, since anyone
can purchase any kind of private insurance. Professor Childres, in
a more recent discussion, asserted that "only two alternatives
remain: either society compensates the victim, or he suffers the
consequences alone."'" At another place, he answered those who
19. State compensation has been recommended by Senator Dodd and
former Senator Keating. Washington Post, Nov. 29, 1964, p. E6, col. 1. Am-
bassador Goldberg, a former Supreme Court Justice, includes himself among
its supporters. Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 205, 224 (1964). See also RAnm, THM INNOCENTS 238 (1964) and Plai-
doyer dun juge pour le justiciable: sentence, cautionnement et compensation,
14 THn ns 213, 223 (1964) where it is asked, rhetorically: "si une per-
sonne est victime d'attentat criminel, est-ce-que lEtat devrait verser une
compensation a ces personnes?"
California has become the first state to inaugurate a plan of victim com-
pensation but, unlike the English and New Zealand prototypes, the California
system is tied to the Welfare Code and incorporates a provision for the
assessment against the offender of "a fine commensurate in amount with the
offense committed (not the injuries inflicted)" to be deposited in the In-
demnity Fund in the State Treasury from which fund the payments to victims
will be drawn. CAL. STAT. ch. 1549 (1965). This is a strangely incongruous
concession of governmental responsibility in a state whose laws were recently
amended to declare the government immune from liability for injuries sustained
as a result of a failure of the police to arrest or from the failure to provide
adequate police protection. CAL,. Gov'T CODE §§ 845, 846.
In addition, Senator Yarborough introduced a bill in Congress to establish
a federal victim compensation plan. S. 2155, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
State compensation has been effectuated in New Zealand, see Cameron,
Compensation for Victims of Crime: The New Zealand Experiment, 12 J. PUB.
L. 367 (1963) and in England, at least experimentally, see Compensation for
Victims of Crimes of Violence, Cmnx. No. 2323 (1964). At the January 20,
1965, meeting of the Illinois Academy of Criminology, a panel discussed the
subject of restitution to crime victims under the topic title "Should restitution
by made by Federal, State, or Local Governments to Victims of Crimes.. ?"
The phrasing of the question assumes the inadequacy of other alternatives.
20. Inbau, Miller, Montrose, Mueller, Silving, Williams & Weihofen, Com-
pensation for Victims of Criminal Violence, S J. PuB. L. 191, 218, 219 (1959).
21. Childres, The Victims, Harper's Magazine, April 1964, p. 159.
VICTIM COMPENSATION
might advance other proposals: "to argue that private insurance
is the solution is merely to deny that the problem exists.
22
PRIVATE INSURANCE
With this background of legislative activity and scholarly com-
mentary, I venture, with some trepidation, into my proposals for
a system of private insurance to compensate the victims of crime.
Any assessment of private insurance must begin with a dis-
claimer. Admittedly, it cannot be the placebo for all crime vic-
tims, since not all victims either will or can insure themselves
against the possibility of loss or injury from crime. On the other
hand, we are so far from public acceptance of state compensation
that to denounce private insurance in conclusory or cavalier terms
does little justice to the interests of crime victims or to the cause
of compensating them. This is particularly so since this country's
movement toward the "welfare state" is decades behind that of
other countries. The reasons for this "lag" are apparent in our
history: of alleged and proved pork barrel legislation; of state
plans which have failed, e.g., inadequate state protection of bank
deposits during the depression; of stolid independence, which is
but the outward manifestation of an inveterate, albeit often com-
promised, fear of governmental "paternalism"; of a practical re-
luctance to help those who are able to help themselves or who
caused their own distress; and of the phenomenal growth of group
insurance which has stunted the need and outcry for state assist-
ance, except among those groups, such as the aged, for whom
group insurance is yet inadequate.
With these politically formidable objections to state compensa-
tion, the scarcity of major federal interposition is not surprising.
This political situation is also largely responsible for the limitation
of major state action to workmen's compensation laws. And
even as to implemented plans the public is misled by the contribu-
tory nature of accumulating the funds necessary to pay claims
into thinking that payments do not constitute a gratuity. Social
security or workmen's compensation payments could not, how-
ever, be made exclusively from tax money without considerable
fear of a hostile public reaction, threatening the existence of the
programs themselves.
In addition, there are always constitutional difficulties in select-
,2. Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 444, 457 n. 64 (1964).
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ing certain classes for special statutory protection. Equal protec-
tion of the laws precludes unreasonable discriminations among
persons who are similarly disadvantaged. On that premise, a
statutory plan of compensation for the victims of an aggravated
assault, for example, could not exclude the victims of a robbery.
But even if a crime classification like kidnapping were included
in eo nomine in the compensation statute, those whose injuries
are compensable would have to be delimited with a wary eye on
the rubric of equal protection of the laws. For that reason, the
claim of the father of the kidnap victim or the husband of a rape
victim to compensation from the state fund might not be consti-
tutionally excludable. But these considerations are irrelevant in
the context of private insurance plans which are moved more by the
flexibility of the bargaining table than by constitutional restric-
tions.
In addition to avoiding many of the disadvantages mentioned
above, private insurance has advantages of its own. Almost infi-
nite variations in the kinds, amounts and terms of coverage are
possible. The individual is left free to decide upon any of these
alternatives, depending upon his own situation. Insurance counsel-
ling is always available, even for the most modest wage earner.
In view of this flexibility, the General Motors executive need not
be reduced to the level of a state plan's maximum amount, nor,
must the laborer of little means, who seeks insurance protection,
raise his sights beyond his own earning capacity. Private insur-
ance aims to fill the needs of everyone, leaving the decision as to
which areas are those of gravest and most immediate need to
individual judgment. It is this freedom and variation, dependent
upon a wide range of available choices, which distinguishes private
insurance from state plans, such as that proposed by Professor
Childres.
In Childres'2 3 estimation, those in greatest need of assistance
are the 160,000 persons who in 1962 (214,700 in 1964)24 fell victim
to homicides, forcible rapes and aggravated assaults. To him the
victims of robberies, which in 1964 numbered 111,750, the vic-
tims of burglaries, which in 1964 were more than 1,100,000 and
the victims of unspecified numbers of arsons are not as deserving
23. Id. at 470.
24. All figures for 1964 are taken from 1964 UNIOR CRmm REPoRTS 3.
Childres' 160,000 can be broken down as follows: murder-8400; forcible
rape-16,810 and aggravated assault-139,700. In 1962, there were also
95,260 robberies and 892,800 burglaries. 1962 UxNwoRMa CamM REPORTS 2.
Arson is not tabulated in the F.B.I. crime index classification.
[Vol. 50:285
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of inclusion in a state-sponsored plan since their damages are not
as grave as those of victims of personal injury. 5 Apart from the
fact that many robberies, burglaries, and arsons do occasion
considerable personal injury, at least on a par with aggravated
assaults and forcible rapes, his process of selection would be un-
necessary in a private insurance system, in which each person's
judgment of his own need would rule the day.
Recent statistics indicate that individuals are exercising their
judgment in favor of insurance in awe-inspiring numbers. By the
end of 1963, more than 145 million persons, or 77 per cent of the
nation's civilian population, had some form of protection against
hospital or medical expenses.26 And a substantial, but untabulated,
number of others were insured under programs established by
local, state and federal governments 7 Of these 145 million, more
than 115 million were covered under group insurance plans?' In-
deed, almost 135 million had additional coverage for surgical ex-
penses as well.?9
In addition, 1963 bore witness to the fact that 47 million wage
earners were covered under insurance company programs or other
similar arrangements to replace income lost during disability
periods.0 9 This figure constitutes more than two-thirds of the total
civilian wage earners in the United StatesY1
Life insurance, with frequent additions for wage loss and other
benefits, was also being purchased on a grand scale in 1963. 120
million individuals (nearly two out of every three persons) were
covered at the close of 1963 with legal reserve life companies 32
This represented a gain larger than any in the previous history of
life insurance. The average American family had 12,200 dollars of
life insurance at the end of 1 96 3 .3 On an analysis of life insurance
by economic situation, it has been shown that 71 per cent of all
25. Childres, suma note 22, at 460.
26. HEALTH 1 wsuR&cE Couxcm, 18TH ANNuAL SuRvEY, THE EXTENT OF
VOLMTARY EALTH INsuRNxcM COVERAGE IN THE UWTED STATES AS oF DE-
cmmmBE 31, 1963, at 4 (Aug. 1964).
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 4.
31. During 1964 the civilian labor force-which comprises both the em-
ployed and the unemployed -averaged slightly over 74.2 million. Of these,
the unemployed averaged about 3.9 million, of which the largest proportion
were among teenagers and women. Id. at 25, cols. 7 and 8; N.Y. Times, Jan. 8,
1965, p. 1, col. 8.
82. Lum IwsRm c FAcT Boox OF 1964, at 5.
33. Id. at 6.
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husbands with a salary below 3000 dollars a year owned life insur-
ance; of these, one-third had coverage equalling at least two years'
income before taxes.34 At the moderate income level, 5000 to
9000 dollars, the percentage of husbands insured was 96 per cent,
at an average amount of 11,616 dollars.3
The statistics on insurance upon property are not so readily
available, nor need they be for my purposes. I know of no plan
which proposes to compensate the victims of crime for the prop-
erty losses they have suffered. Professor Childres0 has exempted
such losses on the basis of the exigencies of the moment, which
demand compensation for those most in need, who, in his ap-
praisal, are the victims of certain aggressive crimes to the person.
Miss Margery Fry3?feared a deluge of fraudulent claims if victims
of property crimes were included in any state system. Professor
Weihofen s surmised that a high percentage of alleged victims of
property crimes are not victims at all, but are, in fact, partici-
pators in the crime.
With respect to private insurance against property losses, new
proposals are unnecessary. Many of those who are constantly
exposed to the temptation to embezzle are covered by fidelity
bonds, sometimes, as in the case of executors and administrators
of decedents' estates, by statutory requirement 0 All automobiles
purchased on installment pay plans are required by the financing
agency to be protected by the theft coverage of a comprehensive
policy. Homeowners are likely to insure their possessions under
homeowners' comprehensive policies. Although fire policies do not
insure against thefts,4° theft policies are in ready supply for those
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id. at 10.
36. C ildres, supra note 22, at 459.
37. Fry, Justice for Victims, The Observer (London), July 7, 1957, p. 8,
col. 2, reprinted 8 3. PUB. L. 191 (1959). In her words:
Clearly, so for as offences against property go, any scheme for State
insurance would be wrecked by the ease with which it could be de-
frauded. But crimes of violence against the person are a different mat-
ter. Few people would voluntarily wound themselves to obtain a modest
compensation, and the risk of successful deception is negligible.
8 J. PUB. L. at 193. With all deference to Miss Fry, there is a difference, which
any insurance company can verify, between fabricating an injury and exag-
gerating the extent of an injury, an exaggeration which occurs frequently in
personal injury claims.
38. See id. at 209.
39. Tax. PROB. CODE § 189 (1956); Wis. STAT. §§ 311.04, 310.15 (1960).
40. RIEGEL & MILLER, INSURAN4CE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 435 (4th ed.
1959). Under the terms of the Standard Fire Policy, damages from theft are
excluded. Wis. STAT. § 203.01 (1963) (2d page, line 24).
[Vol. 50:285
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who wish to protect their valuables.41 Personal property is also
protected under the bailment laws of some states, by which the
liability of special classes of bailees is elaborately defined.4 In-
deed, the common law rules with respect to the obligations of
common carriers often make them insurers of commodities shipped
by them.4" And it seems safe to say that few persons of meager
resources will be the victims of property crimes, but even where
they are, the tax laws permit one to claim partial compensation by
permitting the deduction of theft losses from the income tax re-
turn.44 And where none of these protections exist, the victim may
still rely on the police to restore his stolen property, a function
which the police are performing with a high degree of proficiency
these days.4  Furthermore, if a state were to compensate property
losses, then, where the property is insured, the insurer would be
subrogated to the insured's claim for restitution from the state
41. "[T]he relative frequency of offences against property ensures that the
bulk of owners insure against the risk." 37 AusT. LJ. 201 (1963). Coverage
against theft has been expanded with the inclusion of the "mysterious dis-
appearance" clause in such policies. This proviso establishes a presumption of
theft upon unexplained disappearance of the property. See Field, "Mysterious
Disappearance" Under the New Theft Policy, 1945 INS. L.J. 3; Kelly, "Mys-
terious Disappearance" Defined, 28 INs. COUNSEL J. 72 (1961); Opgenorth,
Mysterious Disappearance and Presumption of Theft Clause, 1952 INS. LJ. 97.
42. N.Y. GEN. OBmiGATION S LAw § 5-325 (parking lot operators); WASH.
Ruv. CODE § 19.48.030 (1951) (innkeepers).
43. BlRON, LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 93 (2d ed. 1955).
44. The Internal Revenue Code was amended to limit -the deduction of a
non-business incurred theft or casualty losses to those where the amount of the
loss exceeds $100. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 165(c)(3). The fHouse and Senate
reports on this amendment argue that "it is appropriate in computing taxable
income to allow the deduction only of those losses which may be considered
extraordinary, non-recurring losses, and which go beyond the average or usual
losses incurred by most taxpayers in day-to-day living." 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws A5o, A420. This amendment does not affect the trade or
business expense deduction provisions of § 162. IN. Rnv. CODE of 1954, § 162.
State income tax laws do not generally impose any minimum amount for cas-
ualty or theft losses, but then it may be that the states are not as interested
as the federal government in pressing the use of standardized as opposed to
itemized deductions. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-81(f) (1959).
The business expense allowance of § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code has
recently been read to include attorneys' fees incurred in an unsuccessful, as
well as a successful defense, of a criminal charge. Tellier v. Commissioner, 342
F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).
45. Although automobile thefts may be atypical, the statistics indicate
that the "local law enforcement agencies in which jurisdiction the cars are
stolen recover about 64% of all cars stolen within 48 hours [and that] an aver-
age of 20% of all cars stolen are recovered by departments outside the
jurisdiction where the theft occurred." In all, a total of 89% were recovered
in 1964. 1964 UNnomm CRimE REPORTS 19, 20.
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fund.48 It is unlikely that the public would support such a diver-
sion of tax funds. In view of these considerations, any noticeable
inadequacy in compensating the victims of crime occurs only
where personal injuries are inflicted upon them.
A. WOPMNG PmNcIPLs
My proposals seek: (1), to encourage subscribers to purchase
insurance of their own choice; (2), to remedy present policy lan-
guage which may exclude victims of crime from benefits; and (3),
to raise the level of benefits received by victims to something
nearer their actual damages. Certain postulates have largely
motivated my thinking on this question. Since much of what
follows is predicated upon those postulates, I shall enumerate
them.
1. State control over private insurance, although legally per-
missible, should be kept to a minimum.
2. All persons should be afforded the opportunity to seek in-
demnity through private insurance for all provable damages.
3. The fundamental procedural and substantive premises of
the criminal law should not be impaired in the slightest by legisla-
tive or administrative interference on behalf of the victim.
On the procedural side, I fear that a state system of compensa-
tion will impose obstacles to the exercise of responsible prosecu-
torial discretion in bringing criminal proceedings. Prosecutors
have long had almost unlimited authority to select the causes
they wish to prosecute, to reduce charges and to accept a plea
of guilty to a lesser charge. Although this authority has not been
unchallenged,4 7 it is largely unimpaired by fixed rules.
Under a state compensation scheme, the state will inevitably
become more concerned with the prosecution of criminal cases, if
only to reduce recidivism, and the number of repeat victims who
46. Thus, in Northern Assur. Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 227 Wis. 124, 277
N.W. 149 (1938), an insurer was permitted to maintain an action against a
municipality under the state "mob action" statute upon a claim for property
damages which it had paid its insured. In addition, the present probation
system often acts for the benefit of an insurance company, as subrogee. The
subtle ramifications of this alliance between the insurer, the court, and the
probation department upon the administration of probation deserve extensive
exploration.
47. State v. Ashby, 81 NJ. Super. 850, 195 A.2d 635 (App. Div. 1963),
rev'd, 43 NJ. 278, 201 A.2d 1 (1964), which considers whether a prosecutor
may be compelled to "nol pros" based upon an agreement to downgrade an
offense.
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may call upon the state fund for compensation. The prosecutor's
discretion would thus be complicated and constrained by the
introduction of a foreign element.
On the substantive side, I am troubled by those proposals
which would refashion the criminal forum into a place suitable for
the recovery of civil damages as well as for the prosecution of
offenders. Criminal law and tort law have long been more than
procedurally distinct, for it is well established that many of the
substantive rules of tort law are not those of criminal law. For
example, in tort law the defenses of insanity and mistake of fact
are given scant obeisance, whereas in criminal law they are often
of controlling importance. A merger of these two procedural sys-
tems could hardly be accomplished without jeopardizing many
substantive rules of the criminal law.48 Therefore, to the extent
that a civil action or a state compensation scheme will upset the
balance of the criminal law, it should be approached with caution.
4. Some form of private insurance should be within the reach
of all, and this requires that appropriate benefits be offered at
moderate cost.
5. Benefits should be payable to the victim expeditiously and
without regard to the rehabilitative needs of the offender.
B. ComPuLsoRY INSURANCE
Compulsory crime risk insurance is but a nostrum, as well as
totally without support in law or policy. The hue and cry of the
insurance interests in opposition to a proposal of this nature
would surely be deafening, even to the most taciturn legislator.
Indeed, their arguments are not without painful precedent in
those states where compulsory automobile insurance either is
in force or has been defeated by the pressures of their lobbyists.49
However, the assigned risk plans, 0 resulting from state statutes
which make automobile liability insurance compulsory, still stir
48. On the other hand, tort law is not impervious to change either. A
state sysem of compensation, for example, would all but nullify the last
vestiges of sovereign immunity, at least that is if the theory that the state is
accountable for crimes committed within its borders is the motivation for the
enactment of the state compensation statute. See Fry, supra note 37, at 193.
49. See 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance H 4-7 (1963); EHPxNZWmiG,
op. cit. &upra note 2, at 4, 42-48; Loiseaux, Innocent Victims, 88 TExAs
L. REv. 154, 155-57 (1959); Rislord & Austin, The Problem of the Finan-
cially Irresponsible Motorist, 24 U. Kx. Crry L. Ruv. 82 (1955).
50. The assigned risk "pool" was upheld in California State Auto. Ass'n
Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 344 U.S. 105 (1951). See N.Y. Nxs. LAw § 63.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:285
occasional flashes of insurance company ire, even though insurers
have learned to suffer the handicap of poor risks.
Although the compulsory automobile insurance statutes and
their handmaiden, the assigned risk pool, have been upheld in
the courts5' as valid methods of assuaging one evil of the auto-
mobile accident menace, it is doubtful that compulsory crime risk
insurance would fare so well. From the perspective of the insur-
ance company, it is one thing to require that all persons be insured
and wholly another for insurers to be required to accept all appli-
cants. From the viewpoint of the law, too, that which justifies one
conclusion may be inapposite in another context. Thus, to say
that the state's control over the public ways gives it warrant to
require compulsory automobile insurance is not to say that the
state's interest in crime control validates compulsory crime risk
insurance. Some have even argued52 that the placating effect of
51. In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N.E. 681 (1925).
52. Childres, supra note 22, at 458. Conversely, compensation might
stimulate community support of police crime control efforts. Some have
pointed out that compensation might go so far as to induce private citizens to
aid the police in apprehending offenders. Hussey, Britain Pays the Victim of
the Crime, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), p. 24. But assistance of
this kind is never an absolute good since the peril to the private citizen who
rushes headlong to the fray may be substantial. "Having a go" at criminals
recently resulted in such over-exuberance by the citizenry that Scotland Yard
was called upon to retract, or at least limit, its request for the utmost in com-
munity cooperation. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1965, p. 62, col. 1. One commentator,
however, described the response of the citizenry to the request of the Assistant
Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police to "have a go" at criminals
as "exhilarating" and "a happy development in the fight against crime," ap-
parently in blissful unawareness of the dangers involved. 1965 Cnm. L. REv.
(Eng.) 67. In Washington, D.C., the police have been reported as asking
private citizens not to play the role of the policeman. Washington Post, Feb. 8,
1965, p. C1, col. 8. In some jurisdictions, private citizens are compelled by
statutory command or by a moral duty of judicial origin to come to the aid
of a police officer. See Note, Requiring Citizens to Aid a Peace Officer, 14
DE PAuL L. Ruv. 159 (1964).
And, in his Message on Crime and Law Enforcement, President Johnson
urged his newly-created crime commission to find ways to encourage citizens
"to report crimes, summon assistance or cooperate with law enforcement in
other ways." Washington Post, March 9, 1965, p. A14, col. 6. However, the
good samaritan who jeopardizes his own well-being in an attempt to prevent
crime or apprehend criminals is deserving of first claim under any system of
compensation. California has recently enacted legislation to that end. CAL.
PEN. CODE §§ 18600-02. The New York legislature has been petitioned
to do so. N.Y. Times, October 11, 1965, p. 41, col. 1. A conference on
the absence of good samaritanism among our citizenry was recently held at
the University of Chicago Law School. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1965, p. 81, col. 1.
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compensation, through insurance or otherwise, may constitute a
substantial impediment to the effective prosecution of offenders.
To avoid arbitrariness, state action must bear a reasonable re-
lation to its objective. To impose upon potential crime victims the
obligation of insuring themselves would be as anomalous an
allocation of responsibility as would the requirement that automo-
bile accident victims must bear the burden of insurance. The
heedless man-at-the-wheel or the criminal might more reasonably
be expected to shoulder that cost. Yet, the potential offender is
disabled by the policy of the courts5 3 or legislatures 4 of many
states from insuring himself against the financial risks of his crimi-
nal enterprise, unless, as is the case with fidelity bonds, the poten-
tial victim's interests are also recognized in the policy. That public
policy may derive, in part, from the same logic which suggests
that compensated victims make bad witnesses.
Compulsory crime risk insurance is vulnerable to legal chal-
lenge on the basis of probabilities. It is reasonably foreseeable that
53. No recovery of the proceeds of a policy is allowed even though there
is no explicit exclusion of intentional misconduct by the insured. See Industrial
Sugars, Inc. v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 338 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1964); J.
D'Amico v. City of Boston, 345 Mass. 218, 186 NXE.2d 716 (1962). But see
Zazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964)
(insurer required to pay punitive damages for insured's intentional wrong).
Some insurance policies do exclude certain intentional acts of the insured. The
double indemnity rider to a life policy commonly excludes death occurring
from violations of law by the insured, whereas the life policy in chief generally
excepts death by suicide. Mmm & OsamR, MODERN LiFE INsuRncn 162, 225
(rev. ed. 1956).
Insurance companies characterize this aspect of insurance as the "moral
hazard," which is considered to be "one of the main elements, if not the chief
element, of an insurance risk. . . ." Bienvenu, Arson as a Defense, 32 Ins.
CoUNsEL J. 41, 47 (1965), quoting from Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning,
160 Fed. 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1908).
54. N.Y. Ins. LAw 1 168(6) (2d page, 1st paragraph of Standard Fire
Policy), voids fire insurance on a presumption of misconduct by the insured
where there is a wilful concealment or misrepresentation of any material fact
before or after a loss. Over insuring property under a fire policy is also pro-
hibited for the same reason. M_.ss. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 95 (1959). Profes-
sional liability policies may not insure against wilful or intentional assaults or
batteries. MAss. AiNN. LAws ch. 175, § 111E (1959). Individual accident and
health policies are permitted to include an optional provision avoiding liability
"for any loss to which a contributing cause was the insured's commission of or
attempt to commit a felony. . . ." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, § 969a(2)(j) (1963);
R.I. GEN. LAws AiN. § 27-18-4 (1956). Incorporation is prohibited where
the purpose of the corporation is to insure against the "deliberate or inten-
tional crime or wrongdoing" or the insured. MAss. AiNN. LAws ch. 175, § 47(1959).
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any automobile driver at any moment may carelessly cause harm
to others. In this respect, the risk for each operator is equal. But
predictions must be more guarded in the case of criminal conduct.
For one thing, the crime statistics do not conclusively establish
what they indicate, namely that some persons, for economic or
environmental reasons, are more crime-prone than others. For
another, crimes, unlike automobile accidents, are not susceptible
to homogeneous classification. On an obvious level, property
crimes are distinguishable from crimes involving violence to the
person, and these categories are capable of further delineation
into, for example, homicides and rapes.
Any compulsory crime risk insurance legislation which did not
respect these significant variations would be easy prey to any
lawyer's knife, that is, if the popular sentiment against it were
not enough to suppress it.
C. TnE SPECIAL RISK POLICY
The special or limited risk policy offers protection against perils
ordinarily considered uninsurable. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners has defined it, more expansively, as "one
that contains unusual exclusions, limitations, reductions or con-
tains such a restrictive nature that the payments or benefits
under such a policy are limited in frequency or in amount."'55 Spe-
cial risk policies have been written upon flagpole sitters, divers for
sunken treasure, professional sports participants and, more re-
cently and more to the present point, attempts have been made
to devise a life policy for juvenile diabetics."
With such antecedents, it is conceivable that an insurance
company could prepare and propose a special risk policy for
the victims of all crimes or of a particular kind of criminal con-
duct. Notwithstanding this theoretical possibility, neither insur-
ance companies nor potential insureds would feel such a sugges-
tion to be practical.
Insurance companies would be confronted with a dilemma of
major importance, a dilemma which, it is only fair to record, they
met courageously, albeit unprofitably, in the days of polio epi-
demics.57 Should crime risk policies be offered in areas of crime
contagion, areas which are generally the large metropolitan com-
55. Sommer, Limited and Special Risk Contract, in GRw.G, Ln Am
HEALTH INsTmAcnE HANDBooK 288 (2d ed. 1964).
56. Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1965, p. B10, cols. 1, 2.
57. Sommer, supra note 55, at 999.
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plexes, or should the insurer be less businesslike, gambling on the
financial success of a venture open to all?
Of course, chance can be substantially eliminated by keeping
the premium high enough both to discourage wide acceptance
and to insure a satisfactory return. But in doing so, coverage be-
comes less attractive since it is too costly for most people. That
has been the observable cycle in property crime insurance. Only
a few are able to afford it, since lack of risk-distribution causes
high rates. Since the rate is high, few persons find it within their
means and so on ad infinitum. The circular motion is accelerated,
however, by the fact that special crime risk policies are unlikely
to be marketable on a large scale because few persons are willing
to admit that crime is cause for grave concern. For these reasons,
special crime risk policies are not practical at the present time.
D. EXCLUSIONS IN EXISTING COVERAGE
The inadequacies of special crime risk policies axe more pre-
dictable and more evident than those of existing life, accident or
health policies. But that is not to say that life, accident and
health policies are immune from defect. The inadequacy of many
of these policies to protect against losses from criminal acts must
come as a shock to many policyholders and beneficiaries.
Unfortunately, a considerable number of life and accident poli-
cies are written with benefits excluded where the injury or death
was suffered through "any violation of the law," ' through the
"illegal acts of any person,"8 9 by "homicide," 60 through "the
intentional act of any person,"6' or from "assault or battery" or
58. Woodmen of the World v. Wright, 7 Ala. App. 255, 60 So. 1006 (1913);
California State Life Ins. Co. v. Fuqua, 40 Ariz. 148, 10 P.2d 958 (1932);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Rtoma, 97 Colo. 493, 50 P.2d 1142 (1935);
Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World v. Purdom, 147 Ky. 177, 143 S.W.
1021 (1912).
59. Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Greenfield, 199 Va. 506, 100 S.W.2d 717
(1957).
60. Lloyd v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 225 La. 585, 78 So. 2d 470 (1954).
61. Travellers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U.S. 661 (1888); Continental
Cas. Co. v. Cunningham, 188 Ala. 159, 66 So. 41 (1914); Olson v. Southern
Sur. Co., 201 Iowa 1334, 208 N.W. 213 (1926); Broyles v. Order of United
Commercial Travelers, 155 Kan. 74, 122 P.2d 763 (1942); Patrick v. Pilot Life
Ins. Co., 241 N.C. 614, 86 SE.2d 201 (1955). But even where the policy ex-
cepts an injury or death caused by such intentional acts, the courts steadfastly
refuse to apply the literal meaning of the policy language. Jefferson Standard
Life Ins. Co. v. Myers, 256 Ky. 174, 75 S.W.2d 1095 (1934). Contra, Beem v.
1965]
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"felony." 62 Even without exclusions in explicit terms, the words
"accident" or "accidental means," which are found in the insuring
clause of accident policies and in the double indemnity endorse-
ments to life policies, have been construed to exclude injuries or
death caused by the criminal act of a third person."'
Why do insurance companies limit policies in this way? On
analysis, no convincing necessity or logic justifies this restrictive
attitude. Certainly, the magnitude of the risk is not great enough
to warrant its exclusion, at least in comparison with other causes
of injuries. The risk is not as catastrophic or unpredictable as war
or riot, two other exclusions in such policies. Nor does public policy,
similar to that which precludes a beneficiary who murders the
insured from profiting by his own wrong by recovering on the
policy,64 inhibit the payment of criminally caused claims. Yet,
the denial of a crime victim's claim may well rest either on an
inference that his own misconduct precipitated the injuries or on
the fear of fraudulent claims. Nevertheless, a blanket exclusion of
all claims cannot be justified by such vague phantoms. In the
end, the explanation may be predicated upon an insurance com-
pany practice of denying a claim wherever the occasion allows.
General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 231 Mo. App. 685, 105 S.W.2d 956
(1937).
Some courts, mirabile dictu, construe the exclusion to require a "specific"
intent to kill the insured. Thus, mistaken identity killings become, by judicial
craftsmanship, accidents. Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 80 Ga.
App. 348, 56 S.2d 177 (1949); General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v.
Hymes, 77 Okla. 20, 185 Pac. 1085, 8 A.L.R. 318 (1919); Harper v. Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co., 119 W. Va. 721, 196 S.E. 12, 116 A.L.R. 389 (1938).
On this reasoning, the insanity of the perpetrator becomes relevant to recovery
on the policy. Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 189 A.ed 204 (1963).
Contra, Pruitt v. Life Ins. Co., 182 S.C. 396, 189 S.E. 649 (1937).
62. Langvin v. Rockford Life Ins. Co., 338 Ill. App. 499, 88 N.E.2d 111
(1949).
63. Lambert v. National Cas. Co., 249 Ala. 85, 29 So. 2d 572 (1947). But
the weight of authority is to the contrary. 1A APPim&AN, INsURANCE LAW
AND PRAcucp. § 486 (rev. ed. 1965). The judicial distinction between those
accidents which are accidents and those which are not caused Mr. Justice
Cardozo to remark that "the attempted distinction between accidental results
and accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog."
Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499 (1934).
Sometimes there is a presumption that the injury or death was from acci-
dental means and sometimes not, but this legal crutch is proffered to the
beneficiary, in the main, where there is an issue of possible suicide by the
insured. Cases are collected in Annot., 142 A.L.R. 742 (1943), and Annot.,
12 A.L.R. 2d 1264 (1950).
64. IA APPLEMAN, op cit. supra note 63, at § 381.
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Such denial, however, may constitute an illegal practice in the
conduct of the corporate affairs of the insurance company.65
The restriction of insurance claims grounded in crime losses has
a long history. In a typical theft policy, for example, burglary is
defined so narrowly that what will constitute a burglary in crimi-
nal law may not be compensable within the theft policy 6 Al-
though homicide may be committed in an almost limitless variety
of ways, only those deaths which are caused by
a) an accidental injury visible on the surface of the body or disclosed
by an autopsy, or
b) a disease or infection resulting directly from an accidental injury as
described and beginning within 80 days after the date of the injury,
or
c) an accidental drowning 7
are considered to be accidental deaths within a double indemnity
rider to a life policy. So too, while the criminal law may view the
willing female as the victim of an abortion, the proceeds of an in-
surance policy may be denied her because, in insurance parlance,
a victim cannot be both victimized and willing.6 s In fact, I seem to
recall that Sancho Panza shrewdly unmasked a loud and bellicose
alleged victim of a rape who struggled more fiercely to retain the
compensation she received than the virtue she supposedly lost. In-
surance companies are mindful of the same necessity to distinguish
the victim from the cheat.
The courts too have searched sedulously for the draftsman's
intent in insurance policy restrictions. More often than not, the
search has resulted in undoing that intent. Thus, an accident
policy excluding liability for loss, if the injury causing it resulted
from the intentional act of the insured or of any other person,
was held not to exclude liability for the intentional killing of the
insured by another, since the word "injury" did not include a fatal
injury. 9 In another policy, an exclusion of deaths resulting from
"taking poison" was read to mean the intentional, not accidental,
65. MAss. ANw. LAws ch. 175, § 47(b) (1959); J. D'Amico, Inc. v. City
of Boston, 845 Mass. 218, 186 N.E.2d 716 (1962).
66. VANcE, INsunRiCE 1014-18 (3d ed. 1951).
67. Ormsby, Life Insurance Riders -Disability and Accidental Death ln-
.urance in GREGG, Lum AND HEALTH INsuRAwcE EIANBoox 270-71 (2d ed.
1964).
68. Jacob v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 256 App. Div. 884, 9 N.Y.S.2d
27, aff'd, 281 N.Y. 628, 22 N.E.2d 177 (1939).
69. Ziolkowskl v. Continental Cas. Co., 284 19. App. 505, 1 N.E.2d 410
(1986), aff'd, 365 I1. 594, 7 NE.2d 451 (1937).
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taking of poison,70 even though to do so renders the exception
pleonastic since an accidental death policy by its own terms ex-
cludes intentional acts by the insured.
Indeed, as a general rule, any death is accidental which is un-
forseen by the insured.' On that basis, the survivors of the
Toronto citizen who recently gave his life in attempting to foil
a bank robbery in that city,2 would not be entitled to benefit from
his accidental death policy. Nor, if he had been a bank teller,
who had intervened and survived, could he be certain of collect-
ing workmen's compensation payments, since they too must arise
from an accident. 73 In an endeavor to ameliorate the impact of
these holdings, the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners has proposed a Uniform Individual Accident Policy Pro-
visions Act which, in an optional provision, excludes liability "for
any loss to which a contributing cause was the insured's commis-
sion of or attempt to commit a felony, or to which a contributing
cause was the insured's being engaged in an illegal occupation.' 4
All these perplexities could be resolved by a simple expedient.
A statute could be enacted substantially to the effect that no
insurance company may exclude from benefits under any accident
or accidental death policy losses suffered by the criminal or inten-
70. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Dunlap, 160 Ill. 642, 43 N.E. 765, affirming 59
Ill. App. 515 (1896).
71. Higgins v. Midland Cas. Co., 281 Ill. 431, 118 N.E. 11 (1917); Rele-
ford v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 228, 276 S.W.2d 517 (1955). See gen-
erally 1A APPLEmAx, op. cit. supra note 63, at § 486.
72. Editorial, Compensation for Victims of Crime, 7 CRmr. L.Q. 141 (1964).
73. 6 ScmmER, Worwi N's COMPENSATiON § 1560 (perm. ed. 1948).
Most workmen's compensation statutes, with variations in language, exclude
injuries caused by the wilful act of a third person directed against an em-
ployee for reasons personal to the employee. GA. CODE ANN. § 114-102 (1956);
TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT. art. 8309 (1948); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-49 (1957).
Some state nonoccupational disability laws also require that an injury, to
be compensable, be caused by an accident. The California law seems to be the
most comprehensive, including wage losses occasioned by persons who are
unemployed on account of "sickness or injury." CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §
2601. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43: 21-29 (1964); N.Y. WoRKMEN's CoATP. LAw
§§ 201(8), 227. In Rhode Island recovery seems to be limited to wages lost due
to nonoccupational sickness only. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-39-2 (1956).
Under Soviet law the social security legislation provides payment for dis-
ability resulting from a criminal offense as well as from sickness or accident.
Johnson, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Offenses on English and
Soviet Law, 17 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 145 (1964).
74. The Uniform Act was approved by the Commissioners on June 15,
1950 and has since been enacted in every state. Neal, Regulation of Health In-
surance in GREGG, LiFE AND HEALTH INSURANcE HANDBoOK 1090 (2d ed. 1964).
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tional or illegal act of any person other than the insured, except
where, in the situation from which the loss arises, the insured
acts to prevent a crime or to apprehend a suspect. Nothing in this
provision should be interpreted to permit payments of benefits
to a beneficiary from whose criminal, intentional or illegal act, the
claim ensues.
Such legislative action would not be novel, since the statutes
are already replete with tried and proved exemplars for it.75 Nor
need there be any doubt of its legality. The states have long held
sway over insurance matters, even after the Supreme Court held
insurance to be subject to federal regulation within the purview
of the commerce clause,76 since the proposal does not offend any
known restraint upon the exercise of the state's police powers. Nor
is the intervention of the state in a voluntary insurance arrange-
ment objectionable where, in lieu of any compelling presentation
by the insurers, the equities clearly preponderate on behalf of the
crime victim. This legislation therefore, constitutes my first pro-
posal to alleviate some of the suffering of crime victims.
E. MAJOR OccuPATIoNAL PoLicY
One major drawback of all compensation schemes thus far
proposed or effected is that they keep the level of payments so
low that full compensation for all damages must be a rarity under
them '7 In my view, insurance provides the ideal setting for
achieving payments more commensurate with the losses actually
sustained by crime victims.
At least two possibilities for remedying this exist. The
first is a "major occupational" policy or rider, to be attached to
any outstanding accident policy or rider, and devised along the
lines of the now popular major medical expense rider. The
objective of this rider would be to reduce the burden of loss
of income, when it amounts to a catastrophic expense, by paying
75. Thore, Regulation of Life Imurance, in id., at 1080. Recent legislation
requiring that an uninsured motorist endorsement be offered in connection
with all motor vehicle policies is typical. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2; FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.0851 (1964); Ih. Rnv. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (1963); N.Y. INs. LAW§ 167(2a); S.C. CODE Ax. § 46-750.31(3) (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(b)
(1064).
76. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533(1944).
77. Under the English system "the rate of loss of earnings allowed is not to
exceed twice the average of industrial weekly earnings as determined by the
Ministry of Labor- about $50 a week. Therefore, top rate cannot exceed
$100 a week." Hussey, supra note 52, at 29.
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benefits more nearly approximating the actual wages of the in-
sured than the usual accident policy does.
The worries of those underwriters who fear that raising benefits
will induce malingering by the insured will be silenced by incorpo-
rating into this rider the three features that typify major medical
coverage. A total maximum amount recoverable should be stipu-
lated with the insured sharing a portion of the burden, say ten or
twenty per cent. In addition to the maximum amount and co-
insurance aspects, the coverage might well include a stated de-
ductible, which, in those cases where coverage is attached to an
existing accident policy, could be the maximum payable under
the basic policy plus a fixed sum, called a "corridor." Where there
is no basic accident policy owned by the insured, then a fixed sum
must suffice.
The likelihood is that the major occupational coverage would
more frequently appear as a rider to a basic accident policy since
the experience in the "double indemnity" field has proved that
many persons who would not otherwise purchase such coverage
will do so when it is tacked on to a policy they wish to purchase.
If the pattern follows that of major medical, the minimal cost of
the additional coverage will be a further inducement to wide-
spread acceptance of the rider.
F. PAty AND SuFmIG RIDER
The third remedial possibility arises from my conviction that
pain and suffering, items of what is called "common law damages,"
cannot go uncompensated. In some crimes, particularly forcible
rape, kidnapping and some robberies, the unliquidated claim for
compensation for pain and suffering is all that the victim generally
has. Thus, it would appear to mock the victim and play havoc
with consistency to urge the compensation of a forcible rape vic-
tim, as Professor Childres does,78 and in the next breath to reject
her claim for pain and suffering. The systems in effect in England
and New Zealand do not make that mistake.
Concededly, pain and suffering might rightfully be excluded in
some legal situations. If, in the process of sentencing a criminal,
a judge is unable to assess the victim's pain and suffering, then
the probation statute might condition probation upon restitution of
78. Childres, supra note 21, at 459. Senator Yarborough's proposal for
federal compensation to crime victims defines compensable injuries as "actual
bodily harm and includes pregnancy and mental or nervous shock." S. 2155,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1965).
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the victim's "actual damages or loss," as does the federal statute. 9
If random speculation is the only available guide in proving the
extent of pain and suffering, then we might adjure the command
given to Moses in the Book of Exodus"0 to provide for the victim's
complete cure, which I take it was an admonition to pay actual
(provable) damages only. But, in less exceptional circumstances,
pain and suffering cry out for recompense.
Nevertheless, the format for a policy rider to pay such damages
must be drawn with considerable finesse, since money and fraud
are not, in the estimation of insurance companies, unlikely cousins.
A prototype may be seen in the uninsured (hit-and-run) motorist
endorsements that have burgeoned of late in automobile liability
policies in this country."' As in them, a limit on the maximum
allowable recovery should be established. Questions, which will
inevitably develop, concerning the nature of the conduct which
caused the damages should be settled by arbitration between
the insurer and the insured. 3 Any decision should, by stipulation,
be conclusive as to the rights and obligations of the parties. And,
as a precautionary measure, during the trial period of the pro-
gram, payments should be limited to cases of appreciable injury
79. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964). In the District of Columbia, restitution is
imposed as a condition of probation in only about 5% of all probation orders
and then only in property crimes, or more rarely, assaults. Interview with
Chief Probation Officer Edward Garret.
In some states the court's authority to order restitution is limited to those
situations where probation is ordered. Thus, whenever either a sentence or its
execution was suspended without an order of probation, restitution could
not be compelled. Apparently, restitution would be ineffective without the
probation office to supervise its collection. VA. CoDn ANN. § 53--274 (1958).
Some consider that the granting of probation in order to collect restitution
is an abuse of probation. Letter from Mr. Paul Kalin, former Director, Michi-
gan Saginaw Project in Probation, to the author March 2, 1965.
80. Exodus 21:18-19.
81. A six page bibliography on the subject is included in 19 Ann. J. 45
(1964). The fourteen states which have made the uninsured motorist coverage
compulsory are listed in Aksen, Arbitration Under the Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement, 1965 INs. L.J. 17 n. 4.
82. Experience with the uninsured motorist coverage has indicated the
advisability of delineating in the policy the arbitrable issues to be decided by
the arbitrator. Rosenbaum v. American Sur. Co., 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d
667, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1962).
83. Some states do not permit an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute.
Illinois recently reversed this policy by statute. See Dubin, The Uninsured
Motorist: A Look at the Various Uninsured Motorist Statutes, 15 W. REs. L.
RLv. 386 (1964); Kamins, Uninsured Motorist Insurance: Panacea or Problem?,
53 ILL. BJ. 898 (1965); McLaughlin, Arbitration Under Uninsured Motorist
Insurance, 1962 Is. L.J. 353 (1962).
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and certain crimes should be excluded. Among excepted crimes
should be ranked those in which the insured's involvement bulks
large, namely seduction and statutory rape and others of a similar
nature.
Since I envision coupling this pain and suffering coverage to an
existing life, accident and health or even a theft policy, some
consideration should be given to protecting the proceeds of this
recovery from the claims of creditors. Such is the customary prac-
tice now, by statute,8 4 where benefits are payable either upon
death or total and permanent disability. The statutes should be
reviewed to assure that the claims of creditors could not force
crime victims, who happen to have insurance coverage, to lose the
small solace which that gives. On balance, the avoidance of the
possibility of unnecessary charges upon the public treasury is of
a higher order than the interests of a creditor.
A further advantage of this proposal is the partial alleviation
of the victim's desire for revenge. The thought that vengeance
might so easily be appeased delights me, for vengeance should
hardly be the mainspring of justice.
I am not much persuaded, however, by the suggestion that
compensation will dull the victim's cooperation in the prosecution
of the offender. That criticism has never been voiced with respect
to the victim of theft insurance, where the same possibility exists.
Indeed, to argue by unsubstantiated innuendo is unworthy of
those who would champion rather than deprecate the crime vic-
tim. Moreover, a system of state compensation is vulnerable to
the same criticism and more. State compensation plans will, in a
very real sense, be in competition with private insurance. The
unequal nature of the competition will discourage the purchase of
private insurance, all the more so where the private insurance
policy contains a nonduplicating benefits clause.85
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 385 (1957); N.Y. Iws. LAw § 166.
85. Present group hospital and surgical policies not uncommonly contain
the following proviso:
Benefits shall not be provided under this Contract for . . . any case
provided for, or for which benefits may be or could have been obtained
in whole or in part upon application therefor in the appropriate man-
ner, or by following the appropriate procedure, under any Federal or
State Compensation Act or similar legislation, or any case to the extent
benefits are obtained under any other law of the U.S., the D. of C., or
any State or political subdivision thereof ....
See Exclusion 6 of Family Surgical-Medical Certificate of Medical Service of
D. of C.; Exclusion 9 of Preferred Hospital Service Certificate of Group Hos-
pitalization, Inc. of D. of C.
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CONCLUSION
The best crime insurance, Professor Mlueller has said"" is crime
prevention. The elemental truth of that assertion is obscured by
the ease of its statement. Yet, for my purposes, its truth is evident
since crime prevention has long been a necessary function of those
insurers whose coverage extends to property crimes. Reducing the
ratio of losses and the cost of insurance requires constant vigilance
by the insurer - not only in underwriting the risk, but in educat-
ing the insured to conduct that might make a crime loss less
probable. Present efforts range from recommending safety precau-
tions to tight-fisted enforcement of claim procedures. Undoubt-
edly, more can be done and would be if insurance companies
assumed a greater share of the cost of crime.
Consequently, crime prevention through insurance activity
would be merely one by-product of these proposals which aim to
broaden the payment structure and the insurable class of those
who are crime victims through:
1. Legislation prohibiting the exclusion of crime victims from
the benefits of existing coverages, except in certain limited cir-
cumstances.
2. The issuance of a "major occupational" policy to comple-
ment a basic accident policy or to substitute for it.
3. The drafting of a pain and suffering rider to be attached to
almost any existing policy, with adequate provisions to safeguard
the insurance company from the fraudulent claims of some policy-
holders who might treat this new approach as a windfall rather
than as a method of alleviating their just losses.
Private insurance plans need no defenders. Their obvious flexi-
bility and variability and, on frequent occasions, nominal cost
speak for themselves. Of course, some persons will, by their own
default or for good cause, reject these advantages. 7 But that is no
reason for haste in governmental intervention, for the American
86. Mueller, supra note 20, at 285.
87. In the statement of purposes for the New Jersey Temporary Disability
Benefits Law, it is recognized that
the prevalence and incidence of non-occupational sickness and accident
among employed people is greatest among the lower income groups, who
either cannot or will not voluntarily provide out of their own resources
against the hazards of earnings loss caused by non-occupational sickness
or accident.
NJ. STAT. AN. § 48:21-26 (1964).
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tradition of free choice for all people, rich and poor, has been a
source of national pride.""
88. It would immeasurably enlighten the discourse over crime victim com-pensation to admit candidly that the thrust of proposals for state compensa.
tion is predicated upon the indigency or irresponsibility of some crime victims.Confirmation for this is found in the recent California legislation for crime
victim compensation for the needy. See note 19 supra.
